The title of this paper is plagiarised from Walter Reich's chapter of the same name in Psychiatric Ethics (1) . His discussion concentrates on the ethical effects of misdiagnosis and the consequent exposure of persons so diagnosed to 'the harmful effects of diagnosis'. These effects, according to Reich ' include not only the loss of personal freedom and the subjection to noxious psychiatric environments and treatments, but also the possibility of life-long labelling (2, 3, 4) as well as a variety of legal and social disadvantages ranging from declarations of non-responsibility in family and financial affairs to, under the most extreme circumstance, the deprivation of life' (5) .
After reading this list it seems at least arguable that the harmful effects of diagnosis on those who are correctly diagnosed, such effects being largely due to institutionalised attitudes and not intrinsic to any postulated disease process, do in themselves pose certain ethical problems. This is not to say that these attitudes may not be capable of some justification. It Some of these considerations are crucial to the antipsychiatry movement. Much of the argument is devoted to an analysis of the harmful effects of institutionalised psychiatry (6) , and much else to the beneficial effects of alternatives to conventional methods of treatment (7) . What is not usually denied is that the phenomena whose presence were responsible for the diagnosis should be cause for concern.
The anti-psychiatry movement tends to argue that the process of diagnosis should be abolished altogether. Anthony Clare has made a brilliant and convincing defence of the practice in his Psychiatry in Dissent (8) Let us assume, momentarily, that there is some justification for the harmful effects of diagnosis, ie that 'society' is justified in doing what it thinks is best for people who can be diagnosed legitimately as being mentally ill. The reason that might be given for this action is that the prospective patient is not fully himself or herself. It can be argued that this diminishment of selfhood justifies the noxious psychiatric measures used against the patient. Even assuming this to be true it can in fact also be argued that just because it is justified to treat someone as in some ways less than a person, so much more is it important (as an antidote) to treat the person as a person when we are also seeing him or her as behaving as less than a person. We do not teach politeness by being rude to rude people.
The suggestion that is central to this paper is that no type of therapeutic alliance can get off the ground unless the person in the dependent role is given access to the language of the would-be helper. This is crucial with respect to the psychiatric initiate. If he or she knows and understands the language access is immediate to books, chat-shows, comparing notes with fellow-sufferers, etc. If the psychiatrist takes the patient sufficiently seriously to share relevant knowledge and discuss things with him or her (and not just with relatives) there is an implication that the diagnosis is being used in the interests of the patient. The more the diagnosis remains the property of the powers-that-be (who also mysteriously expect the patient to know what it is when applications for jobs are being filled in!) the more likely it is that the patient is being treated as an object and not a person. No one can deny that the autonomy of the patient can be seriously impaired at least for a time by illness but the presumption must always be that the intact self is inaccessible rather than destroyed (16) .
My argument is that psychiatric diagnosis presents an ethical problem even when it is valid. The chief reason for this is that such diagnosis may have positive consequences for the patient but will also have negative consequences. And these negative consequences are not related to postulated pathological processes but have to do with enshrined social attitudes to mental illness. This is not to deny that undiagnosed mental illness may not bring great evils to the persons concerned. However, diagnosis may bring such evils in its train that the patient may correctly judge that the benefits of the ritual are far outweighed by the disbenefits. It 3) To advise, review and monitor ethical issues related to nursing and the nurse's role within the wider concept of health-care delivery. 4) To advise and explore ways in which nurses could be supported when faced with ethical dilemmas in health care. 5) To advise, review and monitor the educational input of ethics in nurse educational programmes. 6) To advise, review and monitor the patient's or client's role and view when faced with health-care decisions, particularly those related to nursing. 7) To encourage the development and review the resources on the subject of ethics, particularly the updating of a relevant bibliography. 8) To demonstrate to the community in North Wales that nursing has a facility for critically examining ethical issues related to nursing and client health-care. 9) To establish links with other relevant ethical committees, particularly the medical committees in North Wales. 10) To advise the health authorities in North Wales and relevant nursing and midwifery committees on ethical matters relating to nursing and nursing research.
